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The Impact of Pollution  Controls on
Livestock-Crop  Producers
Gary D.  Schnitkey  and Mario J. Miranda
A discrete-time,  continuous-space  model of a livestock-crop producer is used
to examine the long-run effects of phosphorus runoff controls on optimal live-
stock production and manure  application  practices. Quantity restrictions  and
taxes  on phosphorus  application  are  shown  to  reduce  livestock  supply  and
impose greater costs on livestock-crop producers than on crop-only producers.
Restrictions  on  manure  application,  without  accompanying  restrictions  on
commercial fertilizer application, will have only a limited effect on phosphorus
runoff levels.
Key words:  environmental policy, nonpoint source pollution, phosphorus run-
off.
Introduction
Phosphorus runoff from land receiving livestock manure applications is a growing national
concern. The Environmental Protection Agency and many state legislatures are considering
means of regulating manure applications. In this article, a discrete-time, continuous-space
model of a livestock  producing  farm  with  an  agricultural  land  base  is developed  and
analyzed.  The model  is first used to examine  optimal manure  application  patterns  and
-the resulting soil phosphorus levels in the absence of phosphorus runoff controls;  in this
context,  the model  explains why  many livestock  producing farms have soil phosphorus
levels  that  exceed  agronomic  recommendations.  The  model  then  is used  to  examine
optimal livestock numbers, manure application patterns, soil phosphorus levels, and net
returns  under two  alternative  phosphorus  pollution  control policies:  (a) a policy which
limits soil phosphorus levels at every point on a farm, and (b) a policy which limits average
soil phosphorus levels  throughout a farm.
Background
During the 1970s and 1980s, the primary environmental concern was direct manure runoff
into streams  and lakes.  Many federal  and  state laws were  enacted  during the period to
regulate  storage facilities  and manure  application  practices  of large livestock producers
(Bock et  al.).  Agricultural  economists  analyzed  the  costs  and  effectiveness  of many of
these  regulations.  For example,  Ashraf and Christensen  examined the effects of a limit
on everyday manure spreading on dairy farms, and Forster (1975)  examined the impacts
of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on beef feedlot costs and optimal
size.
Recently, however,  concern has  shifted from direct manure runoff to manure affluents
which  enter  the  environment  indirectly.  Phosphorus  runoff has  received considerable
attention because  it is  a  major  affluent  in  several  parts  of the  country,  including  the
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Chesapeake  Bay and Great Lakes  watersheds.  Phosphorus runoff predominantly  occurs
through soil erosion and is thus directly related to soil phosphorus levels.  Soil phosphorus
levels  build up  whenever  manure  or  commercial  fertilizer  applications  provide  more
phosphorus to the  soil than can be used by the crop.
Manure  applications  on many livestock  producing  farms are  believed to exceed  rec-
ommended  levels  based on purely  agronomic  considerations  and have been blamed for
causing "excessively  high" soil phosphorus levels. As a result, policies currently are being
considered  to limit the rate  at which  manure  can  be  applied  to  a parcel  of land.  For
example, the EPA may require livestock producers with more than 1,000 animal units to
adopt  manure  application  practices  which  do not raise  soil  phosphorus  levels beyond
agronomic  recommendations.  Most eastern and  midwestern  states also  are considering
legislation that would apply to a wider range of livestock producers.  For instance,  Ohio
has  passed legislation  that requires all  expanding livestock  operations to adopt  manure
management  plans  that would  limit increases  in soil  phosphorus  levels (Ohio  General
Assembly).  Both the EPA and state regulations would limit the sustained application of
manure  at every  point on a farm.
Phosphorus  runoff control  proposals  have  generated  considerable  debate.  Livestock
producers are concerned with the impacts of policies on production costs and net returns.
Also, they perceive an inequity from having to observe phosphorus application restrictions
while  crop-only  producers  do  not.  Environmental  groups  question  how effectively  the
proposed policies would control phosphorus runoff. And economists question the wisdom
of having a set limit on manure  applications based solely on agronomic  considerations.
Other  policies,  such  as total  farm runoff limits, tax/subsidy  schemes,  and pollution  li-
censes,  may  reduce  phosphorus  runoff at lower  costs  (Baumol  and  Oates;  Jacobs  and
Timmons;  Moffitt,  Zilberman,  and Just).
A model designed to examine phosphorus runoff policies must contain both dynamic
and spatial dimensions. Unlike examinations of  nitrate runoff issues (e.g., Homer; Nanley;
Taylor  and  Swanson),  an  examination  of phosphorus  runoff issues  requires  dynamic
considerations  because phosphorus  soil levels are related to past phosphorus levels and
applications. Moreover, a spatial framework is necessary to account for increases in hauling
costs as manure is applied further from the livestock facility. In the following section, we
develop  a model possessing both of these features.
A Livestock-Crop  Production Model
Consider  a livestock-crop  producer  who  owns  a single  livestock  facility  and  uses  the
manure  generated by the livestock to supplement  commercial  fertilizer  applications  on
the  crop.  The  producer's  objective  is to  maximize  the discounted  sum of current  and
future annual  profits from  the livestock and crop  enterprises:
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(2)  zt+,(a) = gt(xt(a)  + yt(a), zt(a),  a),  and
(3)  nqt =  y,(a) da.
Here, A c  R2 denotes the crop production area, a  E A denotes a point in the crop production
area, and r(a) denotes the distance from the livestock facility to point a. The endogenous
variables are livestock produced, qt; commercial fertilizer application rate at point a, xt(a);
manure application rate at point a, yt(a); and carryover rate at point a, zt(a). The exogenous
parameters  are the annual discount factor,  6; unit profit contribution of livestock, pt; unit
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price  of crop, pF; unit price of commercial  fertilizer, kt; unit cost of applying manure at a
distance  r, ht(r); manure  produced  per unit of livestock,  7; the yield  response function,
ft(); and the phosphorus carryover function,  gt(-).
Equation  (2) expresses phosphorus  carryover as a function of phosphorus  carryin and
current commercial  fertilizer and manure  application.  Equation  (3)  requires  that all the
manure generated  by the livestock be applied on crop acreage. Commercial fertilizer and
manure application  rates and  phosphorus carryover rates  are  measured conformably  in
pounds of phosphorus per acre. That is, one unit of xt represents one pound of elemental
phosphorus applied in the form of  manure, one unit ofyt represents one pound of elemental
phosphorus applied in the form of commercial  fertilizer,  and one unit of zt represents a
test level  of one pound of elemental phosphorus  per acre.1
The yield response  and phosphorus  carryover functions, ft and gt, are  assumed to be
twice continuously differentiable  and subject to the following curvature conditions: f,2 >
0,  ,  t,  <  0,f,22  O,ft,12  0, gt,1
> 0,  1  >  >  gt,2  >  0  , gt, 0  gt,  22  , and gt, 2 C 0.  Since
more time and  power are  required  the further manure  is hauled,  the unit cost  ht(r) of
spreading manure at a distance r from the livestock facility is assumed to be a positive,
continuous, and strictly increasing.  We further assume that there is a minimum level of
soil carryover z > 0,  and that the discount factor is less than one.
For the  farmer's dynamic  profit  maximization  problem  (1)-(3),  the optimal  level  of
livestock production, qt, the optimal rates of commercial fertilizer and manure application,
xt(a) and yt(a), and the optimal rate of carryover, zt(a), are characterized by the constraints
(2)-(3) and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker  complementarity slackness conditions:
(4)  at  0: P  +  7Xt  - 0,
(5)  xt(a)  - O:ptf  1(a)  + gt(a)gt, (a)  - kt  < 0,
(6)  yt(a)  >  O:ptft,(a) + At(a)gt,(a) - ht(r(a)) - Xt  - 0,  and
(7)  zt(a)  >  O:pt, 2(a) +  ,t(a)g,2(a) - b-l, t_,(a)  < O.
Here, ft,(a), f,2(a), gt,(a), and gt,2(a) are the partial derivatives  of the yield and carryover
functions  evaluated  at (xt(a)  + yt(a), zt(a), a); X, is the current-valued  shadow price  of
manure;  and ,t(a)  is the current-valued  shadow price of carryover  at point a.
To  simplify the analysis,  we  assume that the prices and  costs and the yield  response
and carryover functions do not change over time. Under this assumption,  the producer's
dynamic profit maximization  problem (1)-(3)  has a unique optimal solution with a well-
defined steady state. Dropping the time subscript t and denoting the steady-state solutions
by q*, x*(a), y*(a), z*(a), X*,  and II*(a),  it follows  from (4)-(7) that:
(8)  q* - 0:pl + nx* < 0,
(9)  x*(a)  0-  O:pcf(a) +  u*(a)gl(a) - k < 0,
(10)  y*(a)  - O:pcf(a) +  u*(a)g1(a)  - h(r(a)) - X* <  0,  and
(11)  z*(a) >  O:pcf2(a) + u*(a)g2(a) - 6-lu*(a) < 0,
where f  (a), f2(a), ga(a), and g2(a) are the steady-state partial derivatives  of the yield and
carryover  functions  at  point  a.  These  complementarity  conditions,  together  with  the
constraints
(12)  z*(a) = g*(x*(a)  + y*(a),  z*(a), a) and
(13)  q* =  y*(a) da
completely  characterize  the  steady-state  solution to the farmer's  dynamic  profit  maxi-
mization problem.
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Since carryover levels are always positive, (11) may be solved explicitly for the steady-
state shadow price of carryover,
(14)  *(a) = pcf2(a)/(6- - g(a)),
allowing us to rewrite  the commercial  fertilizer  and manure  optimality  conditions  (9)-
(10)  as follows:
(15)  x*(a)  >  0: pf(a)+  f2(a-(a)]  k <0; X-cbb - PLJ1  -J6 1g 2(a)J
(16)  y*(a) > 0  pc  f(a) +  2 -(a)-  h(r(a)) - *  0.
As shown in the appendix,  there exists a differentiable  function  ¢ such that for every
x >  0 and a E  A, there is a z > 0 such that:
f2(x, z, a)g 1(x, z, a)
(17)  O(x, a) = f(x, z, a) +  - - g  (x,  z, a)
(18)  z = g(x,  z,  a).
The function 0  is strictly decreasing  in x  and may be interpreted, with qualification,  as
the long-run  marginal  product  of phosphorus  input.2 Once  derived,  0 may be  used to
compactly rewrite  the complementarity  conditions (8)-(10) as follows:
(19)  q*  O  0:p +  rn*  0,
(20)  x*(a) >  0O  pck(x*(a) + y*(a), a) - k  < 0,  and
(21)  y*(a)  - O:pck(x*(a) +  y*(a), a)  - h(r(a)) - X* < 0.
(22)  X*  =  -pl/7,
will be negative  and  fully determined  by the profit contribution  and manure  generated
per unit of livestock.4 The farmer optimally produces livestock until, on the margin,  the
explicit profit contribution of  one unit of livestock just equals the implicit cost of disposing
of the manure generated  by the livestock.
From (20)(22), the optimal  steady-state  manure-fertilizer  application pattern  is easy
to visualize.  There  is a critical radius r*, characterized  by
(23)  h(r*) = k - * = k + p/rl,
at which  the  economic  cost of applying  manure  and  the  cost of applying  commercial
fertilizer  are  equal.  Out to  a radius  of r*,  manure  is  more  economical  to apply  than
commercial  fertilizer;  beyond a radius  of r*, commercial  fertilizer  is more economical.
Inside the  critical radius  r*, manure  is applied  at a rate that equates  its long-run value
marginal  product to its shadow price plus cost of application:
(22)  - P  X  -
(24)  y*(a) =  (h(r(a))r+-  , a  =  - t  h  ),  an  a).
(Here, i-1 refers to the inverse of  with respect to its first argument.) Outside the critical
radius,  only  commercial  fertilizer  is  applied  at a rate  that  equates  its long-run  value
marginal  product to its cost of application:
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(25)  x*(a)=x -(!a)
Of course,  if the critical radius r* exceeds the maximum  radial extent of the farm, com-
mercial fertilizer  is uneconomical throughout the farm and manure is used exclusively.
Since 0- 1is strictly decreasing in its first argument and manure hauling costs rise with
distance  from  the  livestock  facility,  the rate  of manure  application  exceeds the rate of
commercial fertilizer application everywhere except at the critical radius, where they are
equal. Thus, inside the critical radius, a livestock-crop producer applies more phosphorus
(in the form of manure) than does a crop producer without a livestock operation.  Indeed,
a livestock-crop producer  may actually find it economical to apply manure even though
its marginal  product is negative. In the special case that the yield response and carryover
functions  are  spatially  uniform,  the optimal rate of manure  application  is a decreasing
function of the distance  from the livestock facility  and the optimal rate of commercial
fertilizer application  will be constant.
From (22)-(25)  it also follows that an increase  in the profit contribution  of livestock,
pi, raises the critical radius, livestock production, and total manure application, but reduces
total commercial  fertilizer application.  An increase in the crop price, pc, has no effect  on
the critical radius, raises total commercial fertilizer application, and has an indeterminate
effect  on livestock production  and total manure  application.  An  increase in the cost of
commercial fertilizer,  k, raises the critical radius, livestock production,  and total manure
application,  but  reduces total  commercial  fertilizer  application.  A  uniform  increase  in
hauling  costs,  h(.), reduces  the critical  radius,  livestock  production,  and total  manure
application,  but raises total commercial  fertilizer application.
The Effects  of Pollution Controls
We now examine the long-run pattern  of livestock-crop  production under two types  of
pollution controls that limit soil phosphorus levels. Point-wise  controls would limit soil
phosphorus levels at every point of the farm and are similar to regulations currently being
considered by the Environmental  Protection Agency and  state legislatures.  Whole-farm
controls would limit the average soil phosphorus level throughout the farm, thus affording
the producer some latitude in determining phosphorus  applications at specific  points on
the farm. 5
Since soil phosphorus levels are, in the long run, determined by the sustained levels of
phosphorus application,  point-wise controls  can be equivalently  stated  as limits on the
sustained  levels of manure  and commercial  fertilizer applications at every point:
(26)  x*(a)  + y*(a) < m  a E  A.
Similarly, whole-farm controls can be equivalently stated as limits on the sustained levels
of total manure and commercial  fertilizer applications throughout the farm:
(27)  (x*(a)  + y*(a)) da c  M.
Point-  Wise Pollution Controls
Under point-wise pollution controls, the optimal steady-state rates of manure and com-
mercial fertilizer application are characterized by the following complementarity  slackness
conditions:
x*(a)  >  O:  pcq(x*(a) + y*(a), a) - k - r*(a)  < 0,
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(29)  y*(a)  >  0  pck(x*(a) + y*(a),  a) - h(r(a)) - X* - r*(a) < 0,  and
(30)  r*(a) > 0: x*(a) + y*(a) < m.
Here,  r*(a), the shadow price associated  with the point-wise pollution constraint, repre-
sents an implicit pollution tax on phosphorus  application at the point  a.
From  (28)-(30),  the  critical  radius  r* at  which  commercial  fertilizer  becomes  more
economical  than manure  is not affected by the introduction  of point-wise  controls  and
continues to be characterized  by (23). Inside the critical radius, the point-wise control is
binding if and only if pc(m, a) - h(r(a)) + pl/7  > 0, in which case the implicit tax on
manure application  is:
(31)  r*(a) = pco(m, a) - h(r(a)) + p1/.
Outside the critical radius, the point-wise control is binding if and only if  pcb(m,  a) - k
>  0,  in which case the implicit tax on commercial  fertilizer application is:
(32)  r*(a) = pco(m, a) - k.
Clearly,  if h(0)  - p'/r  > pc¢(m, a) for all a E A,  point-wise  pollution controls will be
nowhere binding and it will be optimal in the long run to apply manure and commercial
fertilizer at the pre-controls  levels  (24) and (25). Conversely, if pco(m,  a) > k for all a E
A, point-wise pollution controls will be binding everywhere  and it will be optimal in the
long run to apply  manure and  commercial  fertilizer  at the maximum  allowable  rate  m
throughout the farm.
If the yield response  and  carryover functions  are uniform throughout the farm,  then,
inside the critical radius, the implicit tax on manure application is positive and declining
with distance  from  the livestock facility;  outside the critical  radius,  the implicit tax on
commercial  fertilizer  application  is positive  and  constant.  In  the  intermediate  case in
which k > pco(m, 0)  >  h(O) - pl/r,  there will be a radius r', characterized  by
(33)  h(r') = pc¢(m, O)  +  p'/17,
within which point-wise pollution controls will be binding. Within this radius, it is optimal
in the long run to apply manure  at the maximum allowable rate  m; outside this radius,
the point-wise pollution constraint is nonbinding and it is optimal in the long run to apply
manure and commercial  fertilizer at the pre-controls  levels (24) and (25).
Thus, point-wise pollution controls are, in the long run,  equivalent to placing a tax on
phosphorus application that typically declines as the distance from the livestock operation
to the point of application  rises. At binding points,  the pollution tax increases  if either
the crop price rises, the profit contribution of livestock rises, the cost of hauling manure
falls,  or the cost of commercial  fertilizer falls.
Whole-Farm Pollution Controls
Under whole-farm  pollution controls, the optimal steady-state rates of manure and com-
mercial fertilizer application are characterized by the following complementarity slackness
conditions:
(34)  x*(a)  >  O: pCq(x*(a) + y*(a), a) - k  - r*  < 0,
(35)  y*(a)  >  0:pco(x*(a) + y*(a), a) - h(r(a)) - X* - r*  < 0,  and
(36)  r*> 0:  A (x*(a)  + y*(a)) da < M.
Here, r*, the shadow price associated with the whole-farm pollution constraint, represents
an implicit pollution tax on phosphorus  application, which is uniform across the farm.
The steady-state pattern of manure and commercial fertilizer application in the presence
of whole-farm  pollution controls is similar to that in the absence of controls. From (34)-
(36), the critical radius r* at which commercial  fertilizer becomes more economical than
manure application  is not affected by the introduction  of whole-farm  controls  and con-
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tinues to be characterized  by (23).  Within the critical radius,  manure is applied at a rate
given by
(37)  y*-(a)  (X  ¢  ,  h(r(a))+  X  +  (h ( r ( a ) ) - pl/q  +  r )
Outside the critical  radius,  commercial  fertilizer is applied at a rate given by
(38)  x*(a) =-(k  a
In the special case  that the yield response and carryover functions are spatially uniform,
the optimal rate of manure application will fall with the distance from the livestock facility
and the optimal rate of commercial  fertilizer application  will be constant.
Thus,  whole-farm  pollution controls  are,  in the long run,  equivalent -to placing a tax
on phosphorus application  that is uniform throughout the farm. In general, the pollution
tax increases if the profit contribution  of livestock rises, the cost of hauling manure falls,
or the cost of commercial  fertilizer falls.
An Empirical Illustration
As an empirical illustration,  we now assess the long-run effects  of point-wise and whole-
farm pollution controls on a representative  midwestern finishing hog producer.  The pro-
ducer purchases  feeder pigs  at 40 pounds  and sells hogs at a weight of 230 pounds at a
net profit contribution of $5 per hog. The hogs are fed in an open-front finishing facility
with  a pit manure  storage.  Based  on these weights and facility,  each  hog is assumed to
generate  manure containing 2.3 pounds of phosphorus (Midwest Plan Service).  The pro-
ducer also raises corn on 1,200 tillable acres that are uniformly distributed radially from
the finishing facility. It is assumed that the price of corn is $2.50 per bushel and the cost
of commercially  purchased fertilizer is $.50 per pound of phosphorus.
The yield response,  carryover,  and hauling cost functions are  assumed to be spatially
uniform over the entire farm and to have the following forms:
1  1
(39)  f(x,  z)  = a0 +  alX  + a2z  - -a,,ix2-  a 1 2XZ  - a2 2
z2,
2  2
(40)  g(x, z) = do  + px +  02z,  and
(41)  h(r) =  '0  +  ,yr,
where x is the amount of phosphorus applied (in either manure  or commercial fertilizer
form),  z is phosphorus  carryover,  and r is the distance  from  the livestock  facility.  For
these  specifications,  the long-run marginal  product function takes the linear form
(42)  (x) =0  - 0 ,x,
where
P1  t0o  _  o1
Oo  = 
a l +  ~-a-1  a2 1  - a12 1-  _  ~(  - 22 ' 1 - [  2p  1 
- 12  (6  1  -1  2)(1 
-
P2)
[ 0 1 = a + [F  + 2a 12 +  (l-  a22.
Note that  40  >  0.  Technical  parameters  of the yield  response,  carryover,  hauling  cost,
and long-run marginal  product functions  are given in table  1.
In the absence of pollution controls, the 1,200 acres receive an average of 27.9 pounds
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Table  1.  Coefficients  of the Yield,  Long-Run  Marginal Product,
Carryover, and Hauling Cost Functions for a Representative Mid-
western Hog-Corn  Farm
Function  Parameter  Value






Marginal Product  ko  .81463
ftl  .02340
Carryover  Fo  2.01480
0l  .17967
02  .79852
Hauling Costs  Yo  2.20000
Y1  .80000
Note:  Coefficients of the yield, marginal product,  and carryover  functions
are adapted from Forster  (1983).
of phosphorus  per acre, with 61%  of the phosphorus  coming from manure  applications
(see  table  2).  Manure  alone  is  applied  out  to the critical  radius  of.59  miles  from  the
livestock facility.  At a distance of .05 miles,  manure is applied at a rate of 33.7 pounds
of  phosphorus per acre, yielding a carryover of 40 pounds of phosphorus per acre. Manure
application rates and carryovers,  respectively,  decline to 26.3  and 33.4  pounds per acre
at the critical radius.  Beyond the critical radius,  commercially purchased  phosphorus is
applied at a constant rate of 26.3  pounds per acre, yielding a carryover  of 33.4  pounds
per acre.
Assuming  that the rate of erosion  is uniform throughout  the farm, total phosphorus
runoff from the farm will decrease  by  15% in the long run if phosphorus  application is
reduced to an average of 23.7 pounds per acre. Under a point-wise  policy yielding a  15%
runoff reduction,  manure  and commercial  fertilizer will be optimally  applied uniformly
throughout the farm at the maximum allowable rate (see table 2). Manure alone is applied
within the  .59 critical radius and commercial  fertilizer alone  is applied at the maximum
rate beyond. Manure, as a proportion of total phosphorus applied, drops to 59%.
On the other hand, under a whole-farm  policy  yielding a 15%  runoff reduction, phos-
phorus will not be optimally applied at a uniform rate throughout the farm. Under whole-
farm controls, manure will be applied above the average rate of 23.7 pounds of phosphorus
per acre near the livestock facility where hauling costs are lower; to compensate, manure
and commercial  fertilizer are applied below the average rate further from the facility. At
.05  miles from the facility, manure is applied at a rate of 29.5 pounds of phosphorus per
acre, yielding a carryover of 36.3 pounds per acre. Manure application rates and carryovers
then  decline  to 22.1  and 29.7  pounds of phosphorus  per acre  at the .59  critical radius.
Outside the critical radius, commercially  purchased fertilizer is applied at a rate of 22.1
pounds of phosphorus  per  acre.  Manure,  as a proportion  of total phosphorus  applied,
rises to 62%.
As discussed earlier,  the effects of point-wise and whole-farm pollution controls can be
equivalently  achieved  through taxes  on phosphorus  application.  As seen in table  2,  the
tax associated with a point-wise policy varies with the distance from the livestock facility.
At .05  miles, the tax is $.59  per pound of phosphorus per acre;  this declines to $.15  at
the critical radius  of .59  miles and  remains at that level thereafter.  The tax associated
with a whole-farm  control policy,  on the other hand,  is uniform throughout the farm at
$.24 per pound of phosphorus  per acre.
As seen in table 3, runoff controls will reduce the optimal number of hogs finished  on
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Table 2.  Optimal Steady-State  Rates of Phosphorus Application
and Carryover and Implicit Pollution Tax at Differing Distances
from the Livestock  Facility,  Under Alternative Policies  Resulting
in  a  15%  Reduction  in  Phosphorus  Runoff  for  a  Representative
Hog-Corn Farm
Whole-
Distance  No  Point-wise  farm


























--  .............------  (pounds/acre)  ---------------
33.7  23.7  29.5
32.3  23.7  28.1
31.0  23.7  26.8
29.6  23.7  25.4
28.2  23.7  24.0
26.9  23.7  22.7
26.3  23.7  22.1

























--  ($/pound of phosphorus/acre)  --
.00  .59  .24
.00  .51  .24
.00  .43  .24
.00  .35  .24
.00  .27  .24
.00  .19  .24
.00  .15  .24
.00  .15  .24
Note:  Phosphorus  application  within the critical  radius of .59  miles is in
the  form  of manure;  outside the  radius it  is in the  form  of commercial
fertilizer. The maximum  radial extent of the farm is .77 miles.
the farm.  Without controls,  a total of 8,888 hogs are  raised.  In achieving  a 15%  runoff
reduction, hog numbers will decline  18% under the point-wise  policy and  14% under the
whole-farm  policy.  In general,  the percentage  reduction in hog numbers is greater than
the  percentage  reduction  in  runoff under  the  point-wise  policy,  while the  percentage
reduction in hog numbers is less than the percentage reduction in runoff under the whole-
Table 3.  Steady-State  Annual Hog Production Under Alternative
Runoff Control Policies  for a Representative  Hog-Corn Farm
Percent  Hogs Produced  Percent Reduction
Runoff___________
Reduc-  Point-wise  Whole-farm  Point-wise  Whole-farm
tion  Policy  Policy  Policy  Policy
0  8,888  8,888  0  0
5  8,161  8,460  8  4
10  7,692  8,033  13  9
15  7,264  7,606  18  14
20  6,837  7,178  23  19
25  6,410  6,751  28  24
30  5,982  6,324  33  29
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Table 4.  Steady-State  Annual  Cost  to Producers  of  Alternative
Runoff Control Policies  for a Representative Hog-Corn  Farm
Percent
Runoff  Point-wise  Whole-farm
Reduction  Policy  Policy
-----------------------------------------------..........-  $)  .................-------------------------------------------------
0  0  0
5  231  135
10  543  431
15  1,001  889
20  1,619  1,508
25  2,400  2,288
30  3,341  3,229
farm  policy.  Hog numbers  are higher under the whole-farm  policy  because the  whole-
farm control allows  for higher manure applications.
The effects  of point-wise and whole-farm  pollution controls on net producer revenues
are  shown  in  table  4.  In general,  the cost borne  by  producers  rises with  the required
reduction in runoff. For example, under a point-wise policy, long-run producer profits fall
$1,001  per year under a  15% runoff reduction and $3,341  a year under a  30% reduction;
under  a whole-farm  policy,  long-run  producer  profits  fall  $889  per  year under a  15%
runoff reduction  and  $3,229  per  year  under a  30%  reduction.  Because  of the  greater
flexibility that they offer in achieving a stated runoff reduction, whole-farm controls impose
lower costs  on livestock-crop  producers than point-wise  controls.
The costs of  point-wise phosphorus application controls on otherwise comparable 1,200-
acre corn farms, one with hogs and one without, are shown in table 5. The corn-only farm
faces no costs until phosphorus application is capped below the optimal uncontrolled rate
of 26.3 pounds per acre.  Because  hog-corn producers  apply manure  at higher rates,  the
impacts of  point-wise controls are felt at higher caps. In general, point-wise controls impose
substantially greater costs on livestock-crop producers than on corn-only producers.
Finally,  it should be  noted that prohibiting  "excess"  manure  application  would have
only a limited effect on total phosphorus runoff. Specifically, requiring manure applications
to be no greater than the optimal uncontrolled  level of commercial  fertilizer application
(26.3 pounds of phosphorus per acre) will reduce total farm runoff by only 6%. To achieve
runoff reductions  on the order of 20% or more,  restrictions  would have to be placed  on
both manure  and commercial  fertilizer application rates.
Table 5.  Steady-State  Annual Cost to Producers of a Point-Wise
Control Policy for Representative Hog-Corn and Corn-Only Farms
Maximum
Phosphorus
Application  Hog-Corn  Corn-only
(pounds/acre)  ..........................--------  ----  ($) ...  ----------------------------------------
30  18  0
29  47  0
28  99  0
27  186  0
26  328  19
25  563  143
24  881  349
23  1,282  639
22  1,767  1,012
21  2,334  1,468
20  2,985  2,008
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Conclusion
In this article, we have developed a discrete-time, continuous-space  model of a livestock-
crop producer and used it to examine the long-run effects of alternative phosphorus runoff
controls on optimal livestock production and manure application practices. In an empirical
illustration,  the model  was used to assess the long-run  effects  of pollution controls  on a
representative  midwestern finishing hog producer.
Placing  either whole-farm  or point-wise  runoff controls  on livestock-crop  producers
would  reduce  livestock  supply  and  producer  net income.  For  a given  level  of runoff
reduction, whole-farm controls have a less adverse impact than point-wise controls. Whole-
farm  controls  would  preserve  the  fundamental  relationships  among  marginal  costs  of
application, allowing higher rates of manure application near the farm, where it is cheapest,
and lower rates at greater distances, just as in the absence of controls. Whole-farm runoff
controls are equivalent to a spatially uniform tax on phosphorus  application; point-wise
controls,  on the other hand,  are equivalent to a tax on phosphorus application that rises
with the proximity to the livestock facility.
Prohibiting the manure application rate from exceeding  the commercial  fertilizer rate
probably would have only a small effect  on phosphorus  runoff.  In order  to achieve  sig-
nificant runoff reductions  from livestock-crop  producing farms,  restrictions would have
to be placed  on both manure and  commercial  fertilizer application.  Constraining  phos-
phorus application  on livestock-crop farms but not on crop-only farms would be difficult
to justify.  Consideration  should  therefore  be given to limiting phosphorus  applications
on both livestock-crop and crop-only farms. Phosphorus application limits, however, can
be expected to have a substantially greater economic impact on livestock-crop producers
than on crop-only producers.
[Received January 1992;  final revision received September 1992.]
Notes
Hog manure contains approximately  .25% phosphorus by weight, implying that approximately 400 pounds
of manure  are required  for one pound of phosphorus;  a typical  0-45-0  fertilizer  contains  approximately 20%
phosphorus by weight, implying that approximately five pounds of commercial  fertilizer  are required  for one
pound of phosphorus. Research strongly supports the assumption implicitly made here that manure phosphorus
and commercial fertilizer phosphorus are perfect substitutes in crop production (Gilbertson et al.; Midwest Plan
Service).
2  The term pcb(x*, a) will equal the current plus discounted future value marginal product of phosphorus input
in steady state; as such, the function <  performs the role a long-run marginal product function would be expected
to play. The function q, however, depends on the discount factor 5; it cannot be constructed from the underlying
technical production and carryover relations alone.
3 The condition merely requires  that the value marginal  product of manure  at the zero input level and the
unit cost of commercial  fertilizer  both exceed  the net unit cost of applying manure at a point adjacent to the
livestock facility.  Otherwise,  it would be unprofitable  to produce  livestock,  a degenerate case of no particular
interest to us here.
4 The negative of the shadow price, pl'/,  is the amount the farmer would be willing to pay to dispose of manure
at its source; if a commercial  manure disposal service was available at a lower cost than this, the farmer would
profit from contracting  the service.  Because  off-farm manure disposal  is relatively rare in the U.S., we restrict
our attention to the more common case  of complete  on-farm disposal of manure.
5  Generally,  the rate of phosphorus runoff is the mathematical product  of the soil phosphorus level and the
rate of erosion.  The policies  examined here, like most of the policies currently being considered for legislation,
attempt to reduce soil phosphorus levels.  Alternatively, policies  could be designed to reduce phosphorus runoff
by reducing soil erosion rates, say, by influencing producer tillage and cropping practices. Such runoff reduction
policies are beyond the scope of the current  research, but merit further consideration.
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Appendix
Consider first equation (18), which implicitly defines the steady-state level of phosphorus carryover z associated
with a sustained level of phosphorus  application x at a point a. Let G(x, z, a) = z - g(x,  z, a) and recall that
G(x,  z, a)  <  0  for  all x  >  0,  where  z  >  0  is  the minimum  carryover  level.  By  assumption,  G(-)  is twice
continuously  differentiable, with  G2  >  0 and G22  - 0,  so that, for every x  - 0,  there is a unique z = z(x, a) >
z such that G(x, z, a) = 0, that is, such that (18) holds. By the Implicit Function Theorem, the solution function
z(-) is continuously differentiable with z,(x, a) = g,(x, z(x),  a)/(1  - g2(x, z(x,  a)))  - 0. Thus at every point, for
any  sustained level of phosphorus  application,  there is a  unique  steady-state  level of phosphorus  carryover;
moreover, the steady-state carryover level is a nondecreasing  function of the application level.
Inserting z(-) in the right-hand side of (17),  we see  that the long-run marginal  product function  ¢(.) is well-
defined and continuously  differentiable for x >  0. Omitting arguments and differentiating,  we obtain
c,(X, a) =f,  +  f 2 z  +  f 2g(gl2 + g22ZI)/(b-  - g2)
2 + (f2g1 +  f 2 g1 2z  + gf1 +  + gf2 2zl)/(6-1  - g 2).
Since g 2 <  1 < 6-', all first partials are nonnegative, all second partials are nonpositive, andfi  is strictly negative,
it follows that  0(()  is continuous  in both  its arguments and  strictly decreasing in its first argument throughout
its domain.
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